Abstract-Traditional approaches to network provisioning assume availability of the reliable estimates for the expected demands.
INTRODUCTION
Traditional approaches to short term network provisioning, e.g., flow assignments, as well as long term network provisioning, e.g., capacity and topology planning, assume availability of the reliable estimates for the expected demands [1] - [4] . In economic models the network, i.e., service provider, can influence the demand by controlling the price of the service [5] - [7] . The purpose of the network provisioning is to optimize certain performance criterion, typically to maximize the revenue generated by the network. Network provisioning decisions may be very sensitive to the estimates of the future demands in models with fixed prices, or, future price-demand curves in models with varying prices. However, in many practical situations reliability of the corresponding point estimates may be insufficient for planning purposes.
Initial results produced by the recent surge in activities related to measurements of the Internet traffic suggest high degree of volatility and uncertainty in the traffic pattern [8] - [9] . This conclusion raises question of reliability of the comparatively short-term network provisioning, e.g., traffic engineering, decisions based on the corresponding point estimates, since significant statistical uncertainty in determining the traffic pattern and possible undesirable transient effects make continuous adjustment of the routing algorithm difficult. A long-term network provisioning, e.g., capacity and topology planning, is a subject to uncertainties in the overall economic conditions. Despite the network may be capable of controlling demands through pricing, the overall economic conditions affect the price-demand curve. As the recent sharp downturn in the demand for communication bandwidth demonstrated, making long-term network planning decisions based on the point estimates for the long-term demand forecast without assessing reliability of these estimates may lead to disastrous results [10] .
Several attempts have been made to evaluate and incorporate the concept of robustness into the network provisioning process. A measure of network lifetime intended to quantify the growth and shifts in the load (traffic demand perturbations) that a network can sustain has been introduced in [11] . A Bayesian framework, based on the assumption that uncertainties can be described by some fixed probability distribution, has been applied in [12] to QoS routing in presence of unstable routes, and in [13] to traffic engineering under varying by "business hour" external demands. Robust network management schemes [14] - [16] , attempting to minimize the worst-case scenario loss in performance due to various uncertainties, have been motivated by decision theory [17] and complexity theory of algorithms [18] . Possible applications of this approach to QoS routing and traffic engineering under assumption that the available to the protocol network state information can be more reliably quantified in terms of the "confidence" intervals rather than point estimates have been discussed in [19] - [21] . This paper attempts to cast the problem of robust network provisioning as a game of the network, e.g., service provider, against the nature. The service provider makes the network provisioning decisions in an attempt to minimize losses due to This work was supported in part by DARPA NMS Program the uncertain demands, while the nature selects a feasible scenario with respect to the future demands. In a case of traffic engineering over or under provisioning causes mismatch between the loads and capacities in the different parts of the network. In a case of long-term network planning over provisioning results in low or negative return on capital investment, while under provisioning results in inability to meet demand and potential lost in the market share. Once the relevant potential losses are quantified (not a simple task!), solution to this game balances risks of over and under provisioning of the network.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections II and III describe some possible multicommodity network flow optimization model under fixed and, respectively, priced demands, assuming complete knowledge of the relevant information on the future demands. Section IV describes models for uncertain demands and casts network provisioning as a game against nature. Finally, conclusion summarizes results and outlines directions for future research.
II. NETWORK PROVISIONING UNDER FIXED DEMANDS

A. Multicommodity Network Flow Model
Consider a network with set of nodes 
where the total flow carried on a link l is l λ , the set of Capacity constraints (1)- (3) can be rewritten in terms of the losses (4) and fractions (5) as follows:
The purpose of the network provisioning is to optimize certain criterion, typically to maximize the net revenue generated by the network subject to the capacity and Quality of Service (QoS) constraints, given demands and prices. In this paper, due to limited space, we consider the following very simple model for the QoS constraint: 
, where the processing and propagation delay associated with link l is l h [22] - [23] .
For this specific penalty function the total penalty (10) after normalization approximates the overall average delay in the network under hypothesis of independence [22] . Note that much more sophisticated models for QoS requirements, based on the utility functions of the sources are possible [5] - [7] . Given price ij p charged by the network for a unit of accepted demand with origin-destination ) , ( j i , the total revenue generated by the network is These optimization problems are reformulations of the well-known optimization problems for network provisioning [22] - [23] .
The purpose of this reformulation is to accommodate demand pricing and uncertainty issues into the network provisioning process.
These models can be generalized to cover cases of multiple QoS classes, Virtual Private Network (VPN) provisioning, stochastic nature of the offered load, etc. The optimization problem for topological design can be also reformulated to accommodate demand pricing and uncertainty issues. Due to limited space we do not consider more sophisticated optimization models integrating pricing with user utilities. In the rest of this subsection we briefly discuss approaches to solving stated optimization problems.
Solving FA and CA problems is comparatively easy [6] - [7] . CFA problem can be solved iteratively as follows. First, given link capacities c , find optimal route assignments ξ by solving the FA problem. Second, given these fractions ξ , find new link capacities c and losses L by solving the CA problem. Third, repeat the process. Note, however, that since CFA problem typically has multiple local optima [22] - [23] , the space of possible initial conditions for this iterative process should be explored.
III. NETWORK PROVISIONING UNDER PRICED DEMANDS
A. Priced Demands
In economic models [4] 
In a case of lightly loaded network
, and thus nk nk nk nk nk nk dp
It follows from (13) [6] .
B. Network Provisioning
If the price-demand relation (11) is known, the network may attempt to price accepted demands in order to maximize the revenue generated by the network. In this subsection we formulate some typical optimization problems. Solution to the optimization problems PA and PFA can be formulated in terms of the link costs [6] . However, solving PCA and PCFA are to a large degree open problems.
IV. NETWORK PROVISIONING UNDER UNCERTAINTY
A. Models of Uncertainty
All, so far formulated in this paper optimization problems for network provisioning assumed that the performance criterion Φ was a known function of the set of design parameters, i.e., controlled variables 
Of course, in absence of uncertainty, the optimization problem can be simply rewritten in terms of the long and short term design variables as follows:
Note that separation of the design variables into long and short-term design variables depends on the particular uncertainties to be incorporated into the model. 
B. Examples of Uncertainty
Any projection for the future demands is a subject to statistical uncertainty. If the underlying statistical model does not change, the statistical uncertainty can be reduced by increase in the amount of historical data used for the projections. However, inevitable variations in the external conditions affecting the demand pattern may severely reduce the amount of historical data to be reliably used for the projection of the future demands. In this situation the point estimates for the expected demands 
C. Network Provisioning
Broadly speaking, there are two possible frameworks for decision making under uncertainty. The Bayesian framework is concerned with the "average" performance by assuming that uncertain parameters follow some probability distribution [17] . This framework has been applied to QoS routing in [12] and to OSPF link weight optimization in [13] . Note that [13] implicitly assumed that all scenarios are equally likely:
The Bayesian framework, however, may not be adequate if one is concerned with the worst rather than "average" case scenario performance. Such robustness concerns can be addresses within the minimax or game theoretic framework [17] - [18] by identifying the network provisioning decisions that minimize the worst-case scenario losses in performance resulted from the uncertainty. However, this approach is typically beyond reach due to computational complexity even for moderate size networks. The following framework offers some relief to this burden. this game has solution in mixed strategies, the value of the game is positive, and the uncertainty results in the performance loss quantified by the game value [24] . Let ) ,.., be the optimal mixed strategies for the nature and network respectively, i.e., the optimal strategy for nature is to select scenario t with probability t ζ , and the optimal strategy for the network is to bet on scenario s with 
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has proposes framing network provisioning problem as a game against nature, where the network makes the network provisioning decisions and nature selects a feasible scenario with respect to future demands. Various extensions of the described network provisioning models, e.g., by incorporating quality of service, protection and restoration, etc., are possible. Despite this paper assumed a multicommodity network flow model, the same approach can be applied to a flow level network model with random flow arrivals. A promising extension of the proposed game theoretic framework appears to be framing the network provisioning process as a sequential (multi-stage) game [25] . This formulation may provide a natural framework for cognitive process of network provisioning. However, the most immediate problem is developing computationally effective methods for solving the corresponding optimization problems. Solutions for some particular cases and relation to regularization of ill-conditioned problems have been discussed in [19] - [21] .
